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Abstract We examined the role of monetary rewards in
failures to act on goals in a Stroop task. Based on recent
developmentsintheorizingontheinterplaybetweenrewards
and cognitive control, we hypothesized that relatively high
monetary rewards enhance the focus and stability of a cued
task goal compared to low monetary rewards, and hence
causeareductioninfailurestoactoncurrenttaskgoalsunder
circumstances that warrant top–down goal implementation.
To test this, participants received a modiﬁed version of the
Stroop task, in which they were either brieﬂy cued with the
goal of naming the color or meaning of targets on a trial-by-
trial basis. After goal cuing, but before presenting the target,
either a low or high reward cue was presented. Results
showed that higher rewards produced a general speed-up.
More importantly, Stroop interference on error rates was
lower in the high reward condition compared to the low
reward condition, revealing that the rewards enhanced focus
and stability of the cued goal. These results provide support
for theorizing that reward processing modulates utility
assessmentofcurrentgoalsbyaffectingattentiontofacilitate
goal-directed behavior.
Keywords Reward  Goals  Cognitive control 
Stroop interference
Introduction
In everyday life, people’s goals can materialize quite
brieﬂy, rapidly and spontaneously. Keeping one’s eye on
goals that are brought to mind quickly and suddenly is
essential for effectively dealing with environmental
demands, especially when multiple goals are potentially
relevant, and current goals are not supported by bottom-up
processes, but should be implemented by the cognitive
system in a top–down fashion in the subsequent encounter
of the environment. For example, perception of an empty
glass elicits different goal-directed behaviors depending on
whether ones goal is to serve a guest, or to do the dishes.
Accordingly, in order to act effectively under such cir-
cumstances, it is essential to keep the currently relevant
goal in mind (Miller and Cohen 2001).
In contemporary approaches to the cognitive control of
goal-directed behavior a goal is conceived of as a mental
representation of an intention to accomplish a task (e.g.,
Altmann and Trafton 2002; Hommel et al. 2001; Jeannerod
1997; Kornblum et al. 1990). An important question in this
domain is how an individual’s attention is focused on a
relevant goal to stabilize its representation when there are
other goals salient that should be ignored, and the situation
provides no clues about what to do. In other words, the
question is how the cognitive control of relevant goals is
regulated. In the present research we examine the role of
monetary rewards in this regulation. Speciﬁcally, we
hypothesize that relatively high rewards cause people to
more strongly focus on currently relevant goals. This focus
should be especially helpful to facilitate goal-directed
behavior in situations where one’s goals cannot be derived
from the environment, and hence, goals are more prone to
forgetting. We report a study designed to test this intrigu-
ing possibility.
A paradigm that has been extensively used in research to
examine the performance of cognitive control of goals is
the Stroop (1935) task. In this task participants have the
task goal to report the color in which words or word-like
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When the color and the meaning of the word are incon-
gruent (the word blue presented in red), acting on the task
goal of naming the color is slower, or more error prone,
compared to when the color is congruent (the word blue
presented in blue), or neutral to the word (e.g., XXXXX
presented in blue; for a review see MacLeod 1991).
Importantly, this Stroop interference effect is generally
viewed as the result of two independent mechanisms (e.g.,
De Jong et al. 1999; Kane and Engle 2003; MacDonald
et al. 2000).
Firstly, in order to react appropriately to an incongruent
trial an individual has to overcome the pre-potent response
bias to read the word instead of naming the color of the
word (i.e., resolve a response conﬂict). More difﬁculty to
overcome this response conﬂict is reﬂected in more Stroop
interference (slower responses to incongruent trials than to
congruent or neutral trials). More important for the present
discussion, the second mechanism involves the extent to
which the person focuses attention on the task and thus
keeps the task goal in mind (i.e., naming the color of
stimuli instead of reading them). Inadequately focusing
attention on the goal and stabilizing its representation leads
to forgetting and greater difﬁculty to act in line with the
task goal, again reﬂected in more Stroop interference
(particularly on error rates; Kane and Engle 2003; see also
Jostmann and Koole 2007).
Here, we aim to show that relatively high monetary
rewards pertaining to the implementation of two alternating
cued task goals (i.e., of indicating the meaning or the color
of a stimulus word) may partly overcome failures of acting
on goals as a result of enhanced focused attention and
stability of goals. In fact, the representation of cued goals
typically shows a rapid decay of activation over very short
periods of time, usually within a second, unless some
intervention based on the utility of the goal focuses the
attention to the goal (see also e.g., Altmann and Trafton
2002; Baddeley and Logie 1999). Research in neuroscience
indicates that the connected pathways in subcortical areas
(e.g., ventral striatum) and prefrontal cortex (PFC) may
play a prominent role in the process of failures to act on
currently relevant goals (cf. Miller and Cohen 2001; Cohen
et al. 2002). Although the neurological basis is not yet fully
delineated, it appears that the utility assessment of rewards
attached to a goal releases norepinephrine in the locus
coeruleus, thereby enhancing focused attention processes
in the PFC and rendering the representation of the goal
more stable.
Capitalizing on this notion, there is research to suggest
that reward cues accompanying a cued goal to engage in
speciﬁc behavior causes people to keep better focus on that
goal (Aarts et al. 2008a, b; Bijleveld et al. 2009). For
instance, short presentation of a goal in concert with
positive reward renders people more successful in imple-
menting the goal in response to subsequent goal-relevant
opportunities, even after a delay longer than a few seconds.
Goals that were presented without reward cues did not
show this effect (Aarts et al. 2008a, b). Thus, although
these ﬁndings are not conclusive, they suggest that rewards
that are linked to a cued goal facilitate attention processes
in the service of the goal, such that the goal can be more
effectively implemented in a top–down way. Building on,
and extending this previous work on the role of rewards in
modulating the focus and stability of goals, we hypothesize
that relatively high monetary rewards that accompany the
cueing of a goal will decrease Stroop interference by
decreasing failures to act on the goal, particularly in situa-
tions where the goal cannot be derived from the environ-
ment (i.e., on incongruent Stroop trials).
To examine our hypothesis, we presented participants
with a modiﬁed version of the Stroop task (see Fig. 1; see
e.g. MacDonald et al. 2000). In this task participants were
cued alternately with the task goal to name the meaning of
words, and the task goal to name the colors in which words
are presented. Thus, which of the two goals is valid was
unknown to participants until the goal was cued at the
beginning of a trial. After cueing of one of the two task
goals, but before the target word appeared, a coin of either
1 euro cent or 50 euro cent was brieﬂy shown, and par-
ticipants were told that they could win the money by acting
on the cued goal quickly and accurately. The coin was
Fig. 1 Overview of the procedure in the Stroop task. After cueing the
goal of indicating either the color or meaning of the target, and a
ﬁxation point, a coin of either 1 euro cent or 50 euro cent was
presented. Participants were told that they could win this coin by
reacting fast and accurately to the target. After another ﬁxation point,
and a delay, the target appeared. The target stimulus box presents all
possible targets. Colors of the target stimuli in the box target stimulus
from left to right are respectively blue, red, blue, red, white, and white
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123presented after cueing of the goal to avoid differences in
encoding of the goal, and hence differences in baseline
attention of the goals at the beginning of the trial. On half
of the trials the Goal to Target Delay (GTD; i.e., the time
between goal encoding and responding to the target) was
set on 2,300 ms. This time interval was assumed to cause
the activation of the goal representation to decay, and
hence increased attention processes are required to keep
focus on the goal over the critical period of time. This
allowed us to examine the effects of monetary rewards of
different value. For exploratory reasons, we also included
trials of a GTD of 6,800 ms to examine whether cued goals
that were treated with high (versus low) rewards would
even survive a longer delay. Thus, the demands to put the
cued goal into action were considerably high, as there were
multiple potentially relevant goals (indicating the color or
the meaning of the word) that were only cued just before
one needed to implement them, and one needed to keep
focus on the goal over time. Moreover, the different tim-
ings rendered the presentation of the target stimulus
unpredictable.
Next, an incongruent or neutral target stimulus was
presented (see Fig. 1). On incongruent trials the word
meaning of the target stimulus was always inconsistent
with its color (e.g., the word blue displayed in red). Note
that this target stimulus contains conﬂicting stimulus
dimensions for both the goal to indicate the meaning, and
the goal to indicate the color. More importantly, also note
that on these incongruent trials the previously cued goal
cannot be derived from the target stimulus, so that accurate
responding on such trials indicates that participants kept
focus on the cued goal. Hence, any enhanced focus and
stability of the cued goal representation by relatively high
rewards should increase accuracy on incongruent trials.
On the other trials the target stimulus was neutral. In the
case of the goal to indicate the meaning of the target these
neutral trials consisted of the word blue or the word red
always displayed in white color. In the case of the goal to
indicate the color of the target these neutral trials always
consisted of XXXXX displayed in either blue or red color.
Note that on these neutral trials the goal-relevant stimulus
dimension (color or meaning) was presented, but not the
dimension of the other (conﬂicting) goal. Hence, on neutral
trials the previously cued goal could be derived from the
target stimulus (i.e., XXXXX in red or blue = color goal;
word red or blue presented in white = meaning goal).
Consequently, any enhanced focus and stability of the cued
goal by relatively high rewards should not necessarily
promote accuracy on neutral trials.
To test our hypothesis that relatively high rewards
increase focus and stability of cued goal representations we
examined both reaction times and error rates. On reaction
times we expected two main effects. Firstly, we expected to
ﬁnd slower responses on incongruent trials than on neutral
trials as a result of the (typical) occurrence of response
conﬂicts on incongruent trials. Secondly, if relatively high
rewards increase focus and stability of cued goals, partic-
ipants should be more ready to implement goal congruent
action (i.e., ready to respond to either the meaning or color
of targets) once the target stimulus appears. Consequently,
on relatively high reward trials we expected faster
responses on both neutral and incongruent trials. Finally,
note that even though we predict that increased focus on
cued goals may be especially helpful when a target stim-
ulus provides no information about what to do (i.e., on
incongruent trials), increased performance on these trials
compared to neutral trials may be difﬁcult to observe on
response latencies, as responses on neutral trials may also
get faster by increased focus on cued goals.
Importantly, on error rates we expected an interaction
between reward and congruency. Speciﬁcally, as the
incongruent trials provide no information about which goal
was cued (and neutral trials do), any increased focus and
stability of cued goal representations should reduce error
rates on incongruent trials, but not on neutral trials.
Accordingly, compared to the 1 cent condition, we
expected that the 50 cent condition would lead to lower
Stroop interference, i.e., mean error rate on incongruent
trials minus mean error rate on neutral trials, due to
enhanced focus and stability of the cued goal. This pre-
dicted effect would suggest that relatively high compared
to low rewards increase focus on cued task goals that
require action soon.
Method
Participants and design
The experiment included 36 undergraduates (24 females).
We employed a 2(reward: 1 cent vs. 50 cent) by 2(goal:
indicate meaning vs. indicate color) by 2(congruency:
neutral vs. incongruent) by 2(GTD: 2,300 ms vs. 6,800 ms)
within participants design.
Stroop task
The Stroop task consisted of 32 practice trials and 128
experimental trials. The procedure within each trial is
depicted in Fig. 1. All stimuli within a trial were presented
in the middle of a computer screen against a black back-
ground. On each trial, participants were ﬁrst cued with a
task goal. Speciﬁcally, when participants had the goal to
indicate the meaning of a later presented target stimulus
they were presented with the single word meaning for
1,000 ms, and when they had the goal to indicate the color
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123in which the target stimulus was displayed they were pre-
sented with the single word color for 1,000 ms (see e.g.,
MacDonald et al. 2000; for a similar goal cueing proce-
dure). The goal cueing event was followed by a picture of a
scrambled coin for 400 ms. Next, a coin of either 1 euro
cent or 50 euro cent was presented for 300 ms, followed by
another picture of a scrambled coin for 400 ms. (see
Bijleveld et al. 2009, 2010; for the effectiveness of this
monetary reward presentation procedure). Then, the coin
was followed by a blank screenshot, and ﬁnally the target
stimulus. The duration of the blank screenshot varied, i.e.
500 ms on one half of the trials and 5,000 ms on the other
half of the trials, such that the GTD was either 2,300 or
6,800 ms. The target stimulus remained on the screen until
participants pressed the A button to indicate blue or the L
button to indicate red on a QWERTY keyboard.
On 50% of the trials the meaning of the target stimulus
was inconsistent with its color, i.e. incongruent trials, and
on the other 50% of the trials the target stimulus was
neutral. As explained above, when the goal was to indicate
the meaning of the stimulus these neutral trials consisted of
the words blue or red displayed in white color. Further-
more, when the goal was to indicate the color of the
stimulus the neutral trials consisted of XXXXX displayed
in either blue or red color. We presented 8 trials in each
cell of our 2(reward: 1 cent vs. 50 cent) by 2(goal: indicate
meaning vs. indicate color) by 2(congruency: neutral vs.
incongruent) by 2(GTD: relatively short vs. long) design,
resulting in a total of 128 trials. In the practice phase
participants received 2 trials of each trial type, resulting in
32 practice trials. Trials were presented in a random order.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually. They received
instructions for the Stroop task, and read that they could
win money by responding fast and accurately. They read
that each trial would start with a 1,000 ms presentation of
the task goal at issue: When the word color would be
presented the task was to indicate the color of targets, and
when the word meaning would be presented the task was to
indicate the meaning of targets. Participants read that after
this cueing of the task goal the amount to be won on the
current trial would be presented, and that they would learn
after the task how much extra money they had actually
won. After performing the Stroop task they were debriefed
about the nature of the study, and thanked and paid for their
participation. Debrieﬁng revealed that none of the partici-
pants indicated that their accuracy performance between
the incongruent and neutral trials would differ as a function
of the rewards. Thus, if different effects occur between
incongruent and neutral trials as a function of rewards they
seem to be rather implicit and subtle.
Results
Response latencies
To reduce the impact of incidental outliers on response
latencies, and normalize the data, we omitted trials with
responses faster than 300 ms and slower than 3,000 ms
(.7% of the data). Furthermore, we conducted analyses on
log-transformed response latencies (Jostmann and Koole
2007), and report untransformed means for clarity. None-
theless, analyses of the raw data lead to similar results.
Then, we performed the 2(reward: 1 cent vs. 50 cent) by
2(goal: indicate meaning vs. indicate color) by 2(congru-
ency: neutral vs. incongruent) by 2(GTD: 2,300 vs.
6,800 ms) within subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA)
on response latencies. Because GTD did not interact with
our reward manipulation (Fs\1.5 for all interactions
involving reward and GTD), we collapsed subsequent
analyses over this factor. This analyses revealed a main
effect of congruency, revealing the standard Stroop effect,
F(1, 35) = 118.80, p\.01, gp
2 = .78, (i.e., slower
response latencies on incongruent trials compared with
neutral trials; see Table 1). We also obtained the expected
main effect of reward, F(1, 35) = 5.04, p\.05, gp
2 = .13.
As can be seen in Table 1, participants responded faster in
the 50 cent condition than in the 1 cent condition. Although
the raw means suggest that the Stroop effect might be
weaker in the 50 cent condition compared to the 1 cent
condition, reward and congruency did not interact, F\1.
Finally, there was a main effect of goal, F(1, 35) = 7.78,
p\.01, gp
2 = .18, indicating that participants were faster
to act on the goal to indicate the color (M = 776;
SD = 233) compared to acting on the goal to indicate the
meaning (M = 811; SD = 237). No other effects on
response latencies were found.
Error rates
Next, we performed the same 2(reward: 1 cent vs. 50 cent)
by 2(goal: indicate meaning vs. indicate color) by 2(con-
gruency: neutral vs. incongruent) by 2(GTD: 2,300 vs.
6,800 ms) within subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA)
on error rates. Because GTD did not interact with our
reward manipulation (Fs\1 for all interactions involving
reward and GTD), we again collapsed subsequent analyses
over this factor. Firstly, this analysis revealed a main effect
of congruency, F(1, 35) = 64.13, p\.01, gp
2 = .65, which
was qualiﬁed by an interaction with reward, F(1,
35) = 7.47, p\.05, gp
2 = .18. As can be seen in Table 1,
and as predicted, the Stroop effect on error rates was
reduced in the 50 cent condition compared to the 1 cent
condition. Most importantly, participants made fewer
errors on incongruent trials in the 50 cent condition than in
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2 = .11.
Unexpectedly, on neutral trials participants made more
errors in the 50 cent condition than in the 1 cent condition,
F(1, 35) = 7.11, p\.05, gp
2 = .17. Possibly, in addition to
enhanced focus on task goals, relatively high rewards
increased eagerness to respond quickly (e.g., Bijleveld
et al. 2010) which resulted in incidental errors. These
incidental errors may also have occurred on incongruent
trials, but as increased focus on the cued goal also reduced
commission of errors on these trials the end result is less
errors on incongruent trials in the relatively high reward
condition compared to the low reward condition. There-
fore, the reduction in Stroop interference in the relatively
high reward condition may be the best estimate of the
degree to which relatively high rewards increased focus on
cued task goals. Finally, there was a main effect of goal,
F(1, 35) = 8.39, p\.01, gp
2 = .19, indicating that error
rates were larger in the color goal condition (M = .08;
SD = .07) compared to the meaning goal condition
(M = .05; SD = .05). No other effects on error rates were
found.
Discussion
In the present research we examined whether monetary
rewards can reduce failures to act on a cued task goal that
is not further supported by bottom-up processes. Firstly,
and as predicted, relatively high rewards led to overall
faster responses. This overall speed-up is consistent with
the hypothesis that high compared to low rewards increase
focus on current goals, as increased focus should facilitate
goal implementation when the opportunity arises. More
importantly, results further showed that high rewards led to
less commission of errors when targets were uninformative
about which goal should be applied (i.e., on incongruent
trials) compared to when the goal could be derived from
the targets (i.e., on neutral trials). Because we cued the
goals before presenting the reward information, this
reduction in Stroop interference on error rates cannot be
attributed to increased attention to the goals when they
were cued. Instead, this ﬁnding suggests that relatively
high rewards increased focus on the cued goal that was
already active in memory, thus preparing the cognitive
system to implement the goal in a top–down fashion. Once
the opportunity arose to act on the goal, this increased
focus reduced the error rate on incongruent trials compared
to neutral trials. This result converges well with current
models of cognitive control that assume that the utility
assessment of rewards attached to a goal enhances focused
attention processes rendering the representation of the goal
more stable (Cohen et al. 2002). What we add here is the
important insight that such enhanced attention to speciﬁc
task goals as a function of rewards has beneﬁcial effects
especially when the goal is not supported by bottom-up
processes via the environment (e.g., incongruent vs. neutral
targets in a Stroop task).
Although the faster responses and reduced Stroop
interference on error rates in the relatively high reward
condition are consistent with an increased focus interpre-
tation, one could argue that these ﬁndings may also be
explained in more general terms. That is, one could argue
that relatively high rewards may function as a kind of call
for increased effort to perform well (Bijleveld et al. 2009;
Locke and Braver 2008; Pochon et al. 2002; Waugh and
Gotlib 2008). In case of the faster response latencies such a
general effort explanation may indeed be applicable. Spe-
ciﬁcally, relatively high rewards may also increase eager-
ness to respond quickly to the target stimuli, resulting in
overall faster responses. This general explanation is not
appropriate to explain reduced Stroop interference on error
rates, however, as fewer errors on incongruent trials com-
pared to neutral trials speciﬁcally indicates that relatively
high rewards increased the likelihood that the cued goal
was kept in mind. Thus, although relatively high rewards
may increase motivation and effort to perform well, pos-
sibly reﬂected by a general effect on task performance (an
overall speed-up of responses), they also increased focus
on recently cued goals as revealed by a relative reduction
in erroneous goal implementation when the environment
did not provide any clues about what to do. This suggests
that rewards in the present research promote goal-directed
behavior through two routes: (1) a more general one that
increases the overall motivation and effort, and (2) a more
Table 1 Mean response latencies and error rates as a function of reward and trial type
Reward Trial type
Neutral Incongruent SI
Latency Error rate Latency Error rate Latency Error rate
1 cent 720 (204) .02 (.04) 919 (330) .12 (.09) 199 (168) .10 (.08)
50 cent 705 (223) .04 (.05) 877 (292) .09 (.07) 171 (129) .05 (.06)
Standard deviations are in parentheses. SI Stroop interference (incongruent - neutral)
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speciﬁc task goal at hand.
The present results suggest that relatively high rewards
did not facilitate response conﬂict resolution (i.e., as in that
case relatively high rewards should have especially led to
faster responding to incongruent trials compared to neutral
trials; Kane and Engle 2003; Mcfall et al. 2009). Interest-
ingly, though, other work has shown that increased effort,
induced by social evaluation, can reduce Stroop interfer-
ence on response latencies (Mcfall et al.; Experiment 2). It
is important to note, however, that in this previous research
a regular Stroop task was used in which there was only one
goal (i.e., respond to the color of target stimuli). McFall
et al., have argued that in this case more effort on incon-
gruent trials can facilitate responding by stronger correc-
tive efforts to override response conﬂicts. In the present
research both color and meaning where randomly alter-
nated and potentially relevant on a trial-by-trial basis, so
that the task did not only involve resolving response con-
ﬂicts on incongruent trials, but ﬁrst and foremost required
focusing on the cued goals. This rather salient task demand
may have attenuated any effects of increased effort on the
more subtle task demand to resolve response conﬂicts.
Notably, previous work on rewards and Stroop inter-
ference that examined the effects of monetary rewards at
the general task level (i.e., perform well on the Stroop task)
between participants, did not ﬁnd reliable effects of this
reward manipulation on Stroop interference (Huguet et al.
2004). A key difference between the current experiment
and this previous research is that we used a modiﬁed ver-
sion of the Stroop task that alternated between two goals on
a trial-by-trial basis, which increased the need to have the
relevant goal in mind for each trial separately, whereas a
standard Stroop task (including one goal that of indicating
the color) was used in earlier work. Furthermore, in the
present experiment, we examined the contribution of
rewards at the concrete goal level within participants, thus
testing the on-line nature of rewards in focusing attention
as to the speciﬁcity of the goal at hand. Rewards are likely
most effective in improving focus and stability when they
are presented in a context that involves multiple goals that
are potentially relevant (cf. Cohen et al. 2002).
In the present research we compared the high reward
condition with the low reward condition instead of a no
reward condition. This procedure has been applied in a
number of studies on the effects of monetary rewards on
performance on different tasks (e.g., Bijleveld et al. 2009,
2010; Pessiglione et al. 2007). One advantage of this
experimental set-up is that the control condition (i.e., low
reward condition) remains very similar to the high reward
condition, but differs only on one aspect (i.e., value). This
was especially important in the present experiment where
we presented the reward information after goal cueing, and
it is likely that presentation of any information between
goal cueing and target presentation will affect perfor-
mance. Nonetheless it is an interesting question of whether
the effects of high rewards depend on a relative comparison
with the low rewards (e.g., 50 cents is relatively more than
1 cent), or whether it is the intrinsic value of the high
reward (e.g., 50 cent) that gives rise to the current effects.
This question provides a promising avenue for future
research.
Recently, there have been a number of studies published
that examined the interplay between goal activation and
rewards (e.g., Aarts et al. 2008a, b; Custers and Aarts 2005;
see also Bijleveld et al. 2010). This research has primarily
focused on effects of rewards in affecting the incentive
value of the cued goal, or persistence (effort or resource
recruitment) to reach the end state of a goal. The present
research extends previous work on the relation between
goals and rewards by showing the facilitative effect of
monetary rewards in focusing attention on cued task goal
representations, resulting in improved goal-implementation
when this implementation is not supported by bottom-up
processes via the environment, but should be implemented
by the cognitive system in a top–down fashion. A reward
can thus function as a signal that promotes the signiﬁcance
of a speciﬁc goal in a speciﬁc context. By elucidating the
role of rewards in increasing the focus and stability of goals
that are brieﬂy cued in people’s mind, we believe that the
present research shows one important function of rewards,
and hope that more attention will be devoted to the role of
rewards in goal-directed behavior and cognitive control in
future research.
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